




Data and Artificial Intelligence for Better and 








I) Initial thoughts: the whys and the whats  
 
Contemplating the end of the XX century and in the dawn of the new one, it is clear 
that markets, private initiative and the freedom of choice are the champions for economic 
growth, technological development, innovation and, therefore, welfare. Having said that, it 
is also clear that markets’ dynamics are not without failures and, more striking, that the 
success of a decentralized economy is closely dependent on centralized decision making 
processes. Markets work and will continue to work as the natural ecosystem for private 
initiative and freedom of choice, the engines of efficiency, but they are and will continue to 
be structured on top of centralized decision making institutions, both firms and the 
government. 
Since the contributions of Coase in the “nature of the firm “
2
, the “whys” and the 
“whats” on the existence of a firm are sufficiently clarified. Conversely, the discussion on 
the role of governments has been open to more controversy. Should there be public 
intervention? What are, or should be the motivation for an intervention? Should there be a 
limit to public intervention? Should it exercise more or less control on resource allocation? 
Should there be a requirement to justify an intervention?  
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There is extended literature on these topics, motivating academic and political debate
3
. 
Following this literature it is interesting to notice that the discussion has taken a different 
path during the last decades. The initial debate on regulation or deregulation was left 
behind and replaced for a discussion on the quality of regulation. Accepting that the 
“invisible hand” of rivalry and private initiative may not be sufficient to guarantee 
efficiency and intra and inter-generational equity, the question is how and if the “visible 
hand” is able to do it better. 
Supporting this new question there is a conjecture and an evidence
4
: a conjecture that 
markets fail but regulation also fails; and the evidence that, even though regulation creates 
benefices, it also raises costs and inefficiencies that will impact on citizens, firms the public 
administration. Therefore, public intervention has to be thought, designed, implemented 
and monitored in such a way that it guarantees a positive contribution to welfare, i.e., 
public intervention requires a demonstration that positive impacts will outweigh the 
expected costs. This approach demands an evidence-based approach to regulation meaning 
that policy making should be supported by information on expected or observed impacts.  
In this paper we discuss the challenges that are raised by this approach to regulation 
and how the new tools of data technologies and artificial intelligence provide answers to 
some of the more relevant difficulties. It’s a first reflection supported on a literature 
revision: we start by reviewing the concept and the difficulties that are faced by an 
evidence-based regulation, what are the Better Regulation programs and the importance of 
the impact assessment tool (II); we then discuss the contribution of data science and 
artificial intelligence for regulation (III); we conclude with a reflection on how this new 
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II) Evidence-based regulation – to regulate better  
 
After the privatisation and liberalization movement that occurred during the final 
decades of the last century, and the consequent debate on regulation, deregulation and re-
regulation, the focus has shifted to the quality of regulation. The Better Regulation 
programs that started to be adopted throughout the European countries and by the 




A “Better Regulation” agenda embodies a regulatory effort that is simultaneously an 
objective and also a process.
6
 On one perspective, to have “better regulation” is to be able 
to respond to different challenges. First, regulatory drafts should improve in quality, being 
simpler, clear, providing legal certainty. Second, the measures that are adopted should be 
SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-limited)
7
, and fit for purpose, 
in the sense that they should be adequate and proportional to the public policy objectives, 
not creating unnecessary burdens for citizens and firms. Third, regulation should also be fit 
for future, and this is a two folded objective:  regulation should be flexible, so that it can 
adapt to new realities and to social end technological evolutions; it should be innovation 
driven, promoting the transmission of knowledge and avoiding the creation of barriers to 
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, it should be resilient, preparing society and the economy to react and 
respond to disruptive shocks.  
On another perspective, to “better regulate” also means to implement a regulatory 
process that should be more efficient and effective. A regulatory process that is no longer 
viewed as a linear sequence of independent stages but rather a cycle of interconnected 
steps that feed from one another reinforcing themselves. These interconnected steps will 













 monitoring, and 6
th
 
revision. These phases are implemented successively and circularly, and are supported by 
two fundamental pillars: the production of information to assist an evidence-based decision 
making process and the participation of stakeholder (stakeholder engagement). 
In the background of the regulatory cycle there will be a fundamental relation between 
the policy decision-maker and the stakeholders that are directly or indirectly affected by 
regulation. The participation of citizens and businesses throughout the regulatory cycle 
increases transparency and accountability
10
 and allows for a better understanding of their 
needs and the impacts they support. This approach to the end user reflects a concern with 
the effectiveness of the regulation and also with its value for money, i.e., if the burdens 
supported in implementation will be justifiable and proportionate and, in that sense, 
efficient. This is a fundamental change in the way regulation is developed. The focus is no 
longer only on the “ifs” and “whys” of correcting a market failure and promoting welfare, 
but includes a new level of concern on the efficiency of the process demanding for a cost & 
benefit analysis approach to support intervention.   
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To enforce this new perspective, in each phase, the public decision maker should reach 
out to the relevant stakeholders, whether by formal processes of public hearings or by direct 
or indirect informal contacts. Stakeholders are now seen as “‘end users’ of regulation” that 
are close to be “treated as ‘customers”
11
, who will benefit from the public intervention, but 
will also face costs when complying with new rules and obligations. They will inform on 
market and regulatory failures, on their needs and impacts borne, on the effectiveness of 
public intervention and they may also contribute to decrease uncertainty and information 
asymmetries. 
Information becomes fundamental throughout the regulation cycle, and the rule is to 
support any decision on evidence regarding its impacts both expected and observed. This is 
the foundation of an evidence-based regulation that focuses on the impacts, the outputs 
and on the measurement and quantification of results “instead of ‘just trusting the 
doctor’”
12
. To produce information, the regulatory process uses the impact assessment tool 
that can be developed in two moments: at the beginning of the cycle, providing ex-ante 




The ex-ante impact assessment exercise supports the first three phases on the 
regulatory cycle (1st planning, 2nd legislative drafting, 3rd implementation), by informing 
the decision maker on the expected impacts of its intervention. It will provide decision 
makers with information on the economic and non-economic impacts or their decisions 
allowing for a cost & benefit analysis of each measure that is being considered
14
. The final 
 
11




 For more information om impact assessment visit the dedicated internet page by OECD 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-and-
how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox/better-regulation-toolbox_en (visited on the 20/12/20202) 
and read OECD, Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), 2008, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44789472.pdf. Also visit the European Commission Tool Box for 
regulation, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-
regulation-why-and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox/better-regulation-toolbox_en (visited in 
20/12/2020). Also, see Andrea Renda, 
, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006.  
14
 The requirement to support public intervention by demonstrating that the benefits outweigh the costs, was 





decision, which is necessarily up to the legislative body, will be political, so the information 




At the end of the cycle, a second moment of evaluation is needed (ex-post impact 
assessment) to evaluate the performance of the regulation. The objective will be to answer 
the following questions: Is the intervention efficient and effective? Does it generate 
unintended or indirect impacts? Does it contribute to the political objective initially 
identified by increasing welfare? Is there a need to reinforce, rethink or modify the 
intervention? For a more comprehensive evaluation of a political area, a “fitness check” 
would provide information on how several related legislative acts have contributed to a 
political objective. Fitness    checks    are    particularly    well-suited    to    identify 
overlaps, inconsistencies, synergies and the cumulative impacts of related regulation.
16
 
The effort to follow the legislative process with the production of information and the 
engagement of stakeholders (seen as end users) brings the public decision maker closer to 
the private experience, introducing a decision making practice that is driven by evidence, 
performance and learning
17





 high level support and commitment; 2
nd
 the responsibilities for 
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implementing and executing are well established; 3th there are internal competences, and 
continuous training, for executing impact assessment; 4
th
 the analytic tools in use are 
consistent and flexible, so that they can adapt to the objectives; 5
th
 data collection 
strategies are clear and transparent; 6
th
 evaluation efforts are proportionate and well 
directed; 7
th
 impact assessment is integrated into the regulatory cycle; 8
th
 the results are 
communicated in a transparent manner allowing for scrutiny and accountability; 9
th
 the 
public and stakeholders are intensively involved; 10
th
 there is a solid commitment for 
evidence-based decision making. 
Even though these elements seem evident, the striking fact is that they match the 
difficulties that practitioner’s find when implementing impact assessment, which are: 1
st
 
lack of political support and commitment because the process is time consuming and may 
jeopardise political goals and the effectiveness of the intervention; 2
nd
 lack of technical 
expertise in the public sector; 3
rd
 lack of data (in quality and quantity), and the resistance 
to create data centres and to implement auto-learning mechanisms; 4
th
 lack of flexibility 
and capacity to adapt creating regulatory lags and regulatory delays; 5
th
 lack of 
transparency which undermines accountability and hampers stakeholder engagement
19
. All 
the previous will put in stress the capacity for regulation to have quality, to be fit for 
purpose, fit for future and resilient.  
 
III) Data Science, artificial intelligence and regulation 
 
During the last centuries markets witnessed an increase in human productivity 
supported by a transition from muscles to mechanical, then to computation, to networks 
and now to cognitive powers. These were the critical changes that sustained the four 
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The fourth revolution, that is now underway, is driven by megatrends that “leverage 
the pervasive power of digitalization and information technology” and created physical, 
digital and biological impacts. Schwab
21
, the sponsor of the “fourth revolution” concept, 
talks about 21 shifts that will constitute main changes during the next years. We draw 
attention for two of them.  
First (shift 11), the use of big data technologies by government “to automate their 
current programs and deliver new and innovative ways to service citizens and customers”. 
As Schwab underlines, “big data will enable better and faster decision making in a wide 
range of industries and applications”. Contributing to “real time decision making, reducing 
complexity, improving efficiency and cost saving”. This changes will not come without 
potential negative impacts on jobs, privacy, and will raise doubts over accountability and 
trust.
22
     
A second shift to take into account (shift 13), relates to the expected role of artificial 
intelligence (AI) in support of decision making through automated learning cycles. AI “can 
learn from previous situations to provide input and automate complex future decision 
processes, making it easier and faster to arrive at concrete conclusions based on data and 
past experiences”.
23
 It will allow for more rational, data-driven decisions, less bias and the 
“removal of ‘irrational exuberance’”. 
Both “shifts” point to important changes in decision making processes that have been 
well explored by private deciders and should, also, be at the centre of policy decision 
making modernization. The automated learning processes, not only, facilitate decision 
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In support of this tendency, the European Commission’s science service, the Joint 
Reseach Center (JRC), proposes a new perspective in the relation between Science and 
Politics. A “Science for Policy 2.0” model, developed in three directions: 1
st
 ceasing the 
demarcation between science and policy; 2
nd
 putting “science at the service of complex, 
transversal policy issues, rather than keeping it in comfortable, well-defined, scientific 
boxes”; 3
rd
 helping “policymaking  departments  to  deal  with  the  deluge  of  data,  
information  and  knowledge  which  is  now  available”; and 4
th
 “improve  our  future-
oriented  competences  and tools”.
24
  
For the third line of development, Craglia et al.
25
 take on the subject of Big Data and AI 
contribution to the modernization of the entire policy cycle “from anticipation to design, 
implementation, monitoring and assessment”. They recognize the potentialities of 
combining the two technologies, making regulation more adaptive to a fast-changing world 
and more attentive to the “silent and overlooked groups”. With a more dynamic access to 
evidence, policy making will be both more flexible and focused in the individuals 
“addressing their needs, expectations and perceptions”.  
Big Data contributes to this change providing the tools to process a bigger volume of 
data (big volume), in a close to real-time approach (big velocity), with the capacity to 
inform on heterogeneous information (big variety)
26
. Turning into AI, they propose that it is 
time for an “algorithmic governance”, a new approach to regulation that will be, not only, 
more flexible, but also more adaptive with “short feedback loops” and interventions that 
are sensitive to evidence on their impacts, i.e. a regulation that learns and is supported by 
algorithms that learn (machine learning and deep learning, which are steps forward within 
the IA methodologies
27
). Both Big Data and AI (in its many developments) may allow for 
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more flexible, adaptive and responsive policies that might be more efficient and even more 
equitable.  
Notwithstanding this advantages, the “‘algorithmic’ governance” will not come without 
difficulties and transparency, accountability and the respect for individual privacy may 
become an issue. On the one side, decisions will be taken on the basis of rules that might 
not be accountable or understood and privacy protection rules may question the legality of 
the information that supports a “needed based”
28
 approach. On the other, more evidence-
based interventions, that uses targeted information, may improve transparency and 
accountability of policy-makers regarding macro and micro objectives and promises made. 
On the same line of argument as the JRC, the UK Government Office for Science 
(UKGOS) highlights the opportunities and implications of AI for future decision making. 
They focus on the potentialities of these tools to increase productivity at the public decision 
level following the experience and the example of private initiative.
29
  
In the private sector AI has been used in legal activities to reduce the burdens (both 
physical resources and time) of searching for relevant and interrelated information in large 
sets of texts, to expedite due diligence and to support risk assessment. In commerce and 
insurance, this tools have been used to identify behavior patterns and risks. It is clear the 
AI will not replace human intelligence, its role will rather be to provide a helping hand in 
processing huge amounts of data and overcoming complex and repetitive analytical tasks 
that are resource consuming or just outside of the analytical capabilities of individuals. AI is 
integrated as part of a process where the analysis and the decisions will continue to 
demand the active involvement of the human intellect that will have more time for 
productive activities, to identify new paths or new innovative solutions.
30
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The UKGOS proposes that the different data science technics could support the 
government in four areas: increase the efficiency of public services; informed public decision 
makers reducing errors and frauds; raise transparency in public decision making; and, 
provide information on groups that will be targeted by public intervention.  The 
potentialities of the new data technologies are particularly emphasized in what regards the 
identification of patterns and stress points and on “statistical profiling” that uses past data 
to predict the likely actions or qualities of different groups. The use of machine learning 
techniques will support better risk assessment, more targeted interventions and better 
identification of threats. Again, the benefits don’t come without challenges and this 
evolution raise ethical questions in the use of information.
31
  
Still on the use of big data technologies, Van Ooijen
32
 et al., challenge the Government 
to “move from a focus on the external publication of data towards a highly adept public 
service that is skilled in the recognition and use of data as a core component of a highly 
functioning state and the effective design and delivery of its activities.” The authors are 
aiming to the concept of a “data-driven public sector” brought forward by the OECD to refer 
to a Government “which recognises data as an asset, integral to policy making, service 
delivery, organisational management and innovation”. This new Government would bring 
more efficiency to public intervention “promoting evidence-led  policy  making  and  data-
backed  service  design  as  well  as  embedding  good governance values of integrity, 
openness and fairness in the policy cycle”. 
The data-driven government is expected to explore big data in three consecutive 
moments. First, as an “anticipatory government”, using data both to produce forecasts 
about future trends and needs and to develop alternative future scenarios in the framework 
of foresight analysis. Second, as an evidence-driven government, supporting the design 
and delivery of public policies on evidence that reflect the effective need of users and not on 
“assumptions and beliefs of public servants”. Third, and still as an evidence-driven 
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government, developing an evidence-based post implementation performance analysis, 
including monitoring and the revision of the initial options.  
Through the policy making cycle, data helps: to understand the setting and to develop 
the planning; it then informs the decision to support the design; to finally produce evidence 
on the results, the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention, that will feedback to a 
new cycle. At any moment of this cycle, data on stakeholders’ reactions and behaviors will 
allow for a “need led approach” that should be more efficient, effective and responsive to 
social changes. The engagement with stakeholders will allow for a “granular analysis of 
policy problems, producing the insights that lead to contextual variations in policy design 
and implementation, which can boost policy effectiveness, lessen unnecessary burden on 




IV)  Final thoughts: the obvious confirmation, the “hows” and the stresses  
 
We ended the section on better regulation talking about the factors that are 
fundamental to the quality of impact assessment and, therefore, for the improvement of a 
better regulation program. Those same factors matched the main difficulties that are faced 
by policy decision-makers when they strive to develop quality regulation that is fit for 
purpose, fit for future and resilient.  
Taking into consideration all the opportunities presented on the last section regarding 
the use of data and AI, it is obvious the way they may help to respond to the difficulties 
and challenges presented to the better regulation efforts. 
In what concerns regulatory resilience, the aim is to be prepared for unexpected and 
unperceived futures. This demands a good understanding of future scenarios and possible 
risks and uncertainties. Data analysis and learning algorithms may answer to this 
challenges providing analytical tools that are, simultaneously, able to handle large 









Fit for future, is all about flexibility and the capacity to react and adapt. The private 
sector knows how to be prepared for the future and has learned how to adapt and take 
advantage of innovation cycles. They know how to identify and respond to the necessities of 
users, how to create or influence those necessities and how to bring new research and 
developments into the market. They have the resources, both technical and human, and the 
incentive to do so (the survival in the market depends on it).  Does the public decision-
maker have the same incentives, pressures and capacities? We made the point about the 
political commitment for better regulation and the concurrent resistance to adopt a new, 
more demanding, decision process. On the one side, policy makers will be willing to 
improve the quality of public intervention, its efficiency and equity, understanding the value 
of quality over urgency.  On the other side, the argument will be made that politicians have 
a democratic mandate to implement a plan in a given time-frame and should not be 
obstructed by procedures (like impact assessments) that are lengthy and resource 
consuming . Besides this political discussion, there are also the technical difficulties that 
come from the regulatory lag – time lag between the adoption of a new theological by the 
market and the regulatory adaptation to it, and regulatory delay – time lag between the 
creation of a new technology and the regulatory green line for its application. In both 
cases, a new data driven and algorithmic driven regulation could help to increase flexibility, 
providing automated learning cycles and reducing the response times.  
Finally, to be fit for purpose and to have quality regulation depends, mostly, on 
proportionality and evidence-based decision making. This is the core of a data driven 
governance that demands expertise, quality data and transparency of processes. New data 
technologies and artificial intelligence may provide the needed tools to support each stage 
of the regulatory cycle while making the process more transparent, engaging and 
accountable. 
How to put these tools into practices? It also demand’s institutional, professional and 
human flexibility. To achieve this, regulation should turn itself into innovative ways of 
approaching the design, implementation and control that may require experimentation. A 
first line of answers might be found on the regulatory learning processes associated with 





there will! Regarding ethical aspects, privacy and technical capacity. These will be the next 
challenges for academic consideration and for practitioners. For now it seems that we can 
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